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Abstract
Iran’s significant success in implementing Family Planning (FP) during the past 25 years, has made it a role 
model in the world. The Total Fertility Rate (TFR) in Iran has dropped from 6.5 in 1960 to 1.6 in 2012, which 
is well below the targeted value of 2.2 for the country. Iran’s success story, however, did not merely root in 
the implementation of FP programs. In other words, families’ strong tendency to limit fertility and delayed 
marriages had an undeniable role in decreasing the TFR. On the other hand, Iranian policy-makers are very 
concerned about such a decrease and have recently restricted access to contraception, while outlawing any 
surgery that reduces fertility. This paper, tries to highlight the pros and cons of such restrictive policies, and 
argue that the policy-makers might be jeopardizing the success of Iran’s FP program by overestimating its role 
in the TFR reduction rate.
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Iran’s Family Planning (FP) program’s commencement goes back to early 70s, where banners saying “Two children are enough” appeared in every public health sector across 
the country. These policies were then suspended due to the 
political climate after the 1979 Islamic revolution, when 
most policies attributed to the royal family were considered 
western and inappropriate. FP programs were then reversed, 
and the newly established government started promoting 
large family sizes, by providing socio-economic benefits for 
larger families. Soon after the country was imposed by an 
unwanted war against Iraq, these policies were followed to an 
even greater extent, as a large population could be considered 
an advantage. 
During the final years of the war, expert advocacies 
highlighted the importance of reintroducing FP policies to 
the health system to help fix the weakened and damaged 
post-war economy (1). A major drive for this reintroduction, 
was the fatwa (a religious statement by a highly ranked 
clergy man) issued by Imam Khomeini—the former supreme 
leader of Iran—and other top-ranking clerics, stating that 
“contraception was not inconsistent with Islamic tenets, as long 
as it did not jeopardize the health of the couple, and was used 
with the informed consent of the husband” (2). In the next two 
decades, Iran managed to take a leap forward in reducing its 
population, by promoting free contraceptives as well as free 
or inexpensive vasectomies (1); however, this success did 
not merely root in the FP programs, and was also driven by 
families’ strong tendency to limit fertility—mainly through 
natural contraceptive methods (i.e. withdrawal)—and delayed 
marriages (3–6). Overall, the government did a really fine job 
and Iran’s recent demographic change, is often outlined as a 
success story of implementation of FP programs. 
The Total Fertility Rate (TFR) in Iran, has declined from 6.5 in 
1976 to 1.6 births per woman in 2012 (3). One of the features 
that made Iran’s experience unique, was the decline in TFR 
in rural areas (along with cities), from an estimate of 8.1 in 
1976 to 2.4 births per woman in 2000 (7,8). Nonetheless, it 
was the speed and level of decline in the TFR that surpassed 
everyone’s expectations; a target set to be met by 2011, was 
already met by 2000. In other words, while Iran’s first official 
target was set to reduce the TFR to 4.0 births per woman by 
2011, the rate was already down to 2.0 by 2000 (7). Significant 
decreased level of childbearing as well as increased maternal 
and child health, have made the country a role model around 
the globe (9), and the Minister of Health—Alireza Marandi—
was awarded by the World Health Organization (WHO) in 
2001, for Iran’s effective and successful FP programs under 
his supervision (10). 
Recent policy changes regarding Family Planning in Iran
Despite its successful experience, Iran’s approach to FP policies 
has changed during the past two years. It was the former 
president—Mahmoud Ahmadinejad—who first highlighted 
the need for increasing the country’s population, stating that 
Iran could support a population of up to 150 million people. 
He further declared that the “Two children are enough” 
motto, stemmed from a wrong imported western perspective 
(11,12). Shortly after, the supreme leader of Iran—Ayatollah 
Seyed Ali Khamenei—also pointed out his opinion about the 
population control strategies. While expressing his concerns 
about the potentials of the youth population throughout the 
country, he stated that FP control policies should have been 
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ceased in the late 90s. He also declared his worries about 
the current situation which could lead to a TFR below the 
replacement level.
Consequently, serious debates over the necessity of continuing 
the FP programs were initiated among policy-makers and 
scientists. Policy-makers were leaning towards a rapid shift in 
the FP strategies, by restricting access to contraceptive use and 
birth limiting surgeries. Eventually, in July 2012, the former 
minister of health—Marzieh Vahideh Dastjerdi—officially 
stated that the FP budget was cut to a great extent, and the 
Ministry of Health and Medical Education (MoHME) was 
no longer able to provide all the routine public FP services, 
through the public health sector. While the new motto is “at 
least two children is ideal”, the MoHME is currently trying 
to encourage women to have three children by the age of 
30. At present, public access to free contraceptives is not 
banned; however, it is restricted to a great extent. Moreover, 
Iran’s parliament has recently outlawed vasectomies and 
tubectomies, except to save a person’s life. Based on this 
legislation, any medical practitioners found engaging in 
any surgery that reduces fertility, could face up to five years 
of imprisonment. 
Why should we care?
Population control policies are multifaceted policies, and 
various aspects of their implementation are of outmost 
importance. While acknowledging the policy-makers’ 
concern about overshooting the targeted TFR, the possible 
adverse effects of such untargeted restrictive policies on FP, 
as well as their effectiveness in reaching their primary goal of 
increasing the population and the desired 2.2 TFR in the long 
run, should not be overlooked. 
It seems that the role of contraception in decreasing the 
population in Iran, has been overestimated by policy-makers. 
Recent findings indicate that the fertility rate in Iran, began to 
decline in 1985; four years before the introduction of new FP 
policies in 1989 (13). Moreover, studies suggest that only 61% 
of the reduction in TFR could be attributed to FP practices, 
and rest has been mainly due to the elevated age of marriage 
among Iranian women (primarily due to their pursuit of 
higher educations and the shift in some of the socio-cultural 
norms), desire to have no future birth, and other proximate 
determinants of reduction in fertility (4–6). Recent studies 
have also reported that withdrawal practice, is much greater 
among birth limiters; another evidence that indicates the 
limited effectiveness of broad restrictions in accessing 
contraception to increase the TFR (6,14). 
An existing example of ineffectiveness of restricting FP access 
in order to increase the population, could be Romania. A 
law issued in 1966 in Romania, criminalized abortion and 
banned modern contraceptive use, unless for very limited 
medical conditions (15). Although the fertility rate began to 
rise at first, the TFR finally stabilized at 2.3 births per woman 
in late 80s. Another point of concern, would be the possible 
adverse effects of such rapid policy shifts on illegal unplanned 
pregnancies and abortions (usually self-induced or performed 
by unprofessional individuals), due to limited access to 
contraceptives. In Romania, absence of contraceptives led to 
a surge in illegal abortions and as announced later, Romania 
had the highest maternal mortality rate (most of which were 
abortion-related) in Europe during the 80s (15,16). Although 
Romania could be considered as an extreme example of the 
unwanted effects of such restrictive policies, and Iran’s case 
could be very different (as contraceptives are not totally 
banned and could still be accessed through the private sector 
at a higher expense), the possible adverse effects of restricting 
the FP services as well as criminalizing birth limiting surgeries 
should be further emphasized. 
Iran needs a comprehensive purposive population control 
policy, which takes the needs of all socio-economic levels 
into account. Those who would suffer the most in Iran, 
are most likely the lower-income families. Accordingly, 
this could lead to an increase in the socio-economic gap 
between the privileged and the impoverished in the long 
run. Vulnerable women (including female sex workers and 
female intravenous drug users), who rely mostly on public 
services with regards to contraceptives and FP services, are 
another important group of population whose needs should 
be taken into account (17–19). Restricting the access of such 
important populations to contraception, could render tons of 
money and years of effort spent on promoting safe sex and 
reducing sexually transmitted infections (including HIV), 
utterly useless (20). 
All in all, it seems policy-makers are jeopardizing the success 
of Iran’s FP program, by overestimating its role in the TFR 
reduction rate. However, the existing need for continuous 
support of purposive FP programs should not be ignored. 
Today families, are more concerned about the future of their 
children than before, and the generational shifts towards 
higher education, occupation and income are much more 
prominent than before; determinants that have a direct impact 
on limiting or spacing birth (21–23). Policy-makers have been 
promoting smaller family size for over two decades and have 
shifted public beliefs accordingly, hence, questioning all those 
policies and changing the population control policies over 
a short period is very unlikely to meet a high acceptability 
among people. Shifting population policies without proper 
supervision and a timely agenda, could effectively roll back 
decades of efforts to strengthen Iran’s economy through 
maintaining population growth at an ideal level. Iran, is still 
struggling with providing occupation and housing for the 
baby boom generation of the 80s. 
As outlined earlier, several examples demonstrate how a 
single desire for increasing family size, may not necessarily be 
fulfilled through broad and untargeted restriction of access to 
contraception. These hasty policies, are more likely to affect 
the family size of the poor and low-income families, which 
would affect their quality of life in the upcoming years. Iran 
needs to come up with a new comprehensive and multi-level 
program to increase the TFR to its optimum level of 2.2. At the 
same time, policy-makers should address specific important 
issues such as people’s quality of life, possible surge in illegal 
abortions and unwanted pregnancies, risk reduction of HIV/
STIs, and service delivery to immigrants as well as marginalized 
and vulnerable populations. These programs should also try 
to harmonize the efforts in targeting the proposed desired 
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population (150 million), with the differences among people 
living in different geographical zones. As a final point, 
concurrent assessment of the effectiveness of these new 
population control policies, by using different scientific 
indicators in different subpopulations and different socio-
economics, is essential. 
   
Ethical issues 
No ethical issues are raised.
Competing interests 
The authors declare that they have no competing interests. 
Authors’ contributions 
All authors contributed equally to the conceptualization of the paper. MK drafted 
the manuscript and all authors reviewed and approved the final version.
 
Authors’ affiliations
1School of Population and Public Health, Faculty of Medicine, University of 
British Columbia, Vancouver, BC, Canada. 2Research Center for Modeling in 
Health, Institute for Futures Studies in Health, Kerman University of Medical 
Sciences, Kerman, Iran. 3Regional Knowledge Hub, and WHO Collaborating 
Center for HIV Surveillance, Institute for Futures  Studies in Health, Kerman 
University of Medical Sciences, Kerman, Iran.
References
1. Hoodfar H, Assadpour S. The politics of population policy in the 
Islamic Republic of Iran. Stud Fam Plann 2000; 31: 19–34. doi: 
10.1111/j.1728-4465.2000.00019.x
2. Mehryar AH. Ideological basis of fertility changes in post-
revolutionary Iran: Shiite teachings vs. pragmatic considerations. 
Tehran: Institute for Research on Planning and Development; 
2000.
3. Erfani A. Fertility in Tehran City and Iran: Rates, Trends and 
Differentials. Population Studies 2013; 1: 87–107. 
4. Erfani A, McQuillan K. Rapid fertility decline in Iran: analysis 
of intermediate variables. J Biosoc Sci 2008; 40: 459–78. doi: 
10.1017/s002193200700243x
5. Erfani A. A reversal in the population policy of Iran: Do curbing 
family planning programs raise low fertility? The XXVII IUSSP 
International Population Conference; 2013; Busan, Republic of 
Korea.
6. Erfani A, Ilknur Yuksel-Kaptanoglu. The use of withdrawal 
among birth limiters in Iran and Turkey. Stud Fam Plann 2012; 
43: 21–32. doi: 10.1111/j.1728-4465.2012.00299.x
7. Statistical Center of Iran. Iran statistical yearbook 2001. Tehran: 
Islamic Republic of Iran, Management & Planning Organization, 
Statistical Center of Iran; 2001. p. 786.
8. Roudi-Fahimi F, Gupta Y, Swain P, Ram F, Singh A, Agrawal P, 
et al. Irans family planning program: responding to a nations 
needs. J Popul Res (Canberra) 2002; 19: 1–24.
9. Vahidnia F. Case study: fertility decline in Iran. Popul Environ 
2007; 28: 259–66. doi: 10.1007/s11111-007-0050-9
10. Roudi-Fahimi F. Iran’s family planning program: responding to a 
nation’s needs. Washington DC:  Population Reference Bureau; 
2002.
11. Amuzegar J. Ahmadinejad’s Legacy. Middle East Policy 2013; 
20: 124–32. doi: 10.1111/mepo.12051
12. Henry F. President Ahmadinejad’s Speech At UN. update 2013, 
328.
13. Erfani A, McQuillan K. The changing timing of births in Iran: an 
explanation of the rise and fall in fertility after the 1979 Islamic 
Revolution. Biodemography Soc Biol 2014; 60: 67–86. doi: 
10.1080/19485565.2014.899428
14. Erfani A. Factors associated with the use of withdrawal in Iran: 
Do fertility intentions matter? Journal of Comparative Family 
Studies 2012; 43: 301–12.
15. Serbanescu F, Morris L, Stupp P, Stanescu A. The impact of 
recent policy changes on fertility, abortion, and contraceptive 
use in Romania. Stud Fam Plann 1995; 26: 76–87. doi: 
10.2307/2137933
16. Constantin A, Neagu C, Bucur A, Marinescu B. Eight years of 
experience in the first Romanian center of family planning and 
contraception. Eight years of experience in the first Romanian 
center of family planning and contraception 1999; 4: 57–60. doi: 
10.3109/13625189909064005
17. Karamouzian M, Haghdoost AA, Sharifi H. Addressing the needs 
of sexual partners of people who inject drugs through peer 
prevention programs in Iran. Int J Health Policy Manag 2014; 2: 
81. doi: 10.15171/ijhpm.2014.19 
18. Khajehkazemi R, Osooli M, Sajadi L, Karamouzian M, Sedaghat 
A, Fahimfar N, et al. HIV prevalence and risk behaviours among 
people who inject drugs in Iran: the 2010 National Surveillance 
Survey. Sex Transm Infect 2013; 89: iii29–32. doi: 10.1136/
sextrans-2013-051204
19. Alipour A, Haghdoost AA, Sajadi L, Zolala F. HIV prevalence 
and related risk behaviours among female partners of male 
injecting drugs users in Iran: results of a bio-behavioural 
survey, 2010. Sex Transm Infect 2013; 89: iii41–4. doi: 10.1136/
sextrans-2013-051201
20. Karamouzian M, Nasirian M, Sedaghat A, Haghdoost AA. 
HIV in Iran. Lancet 2014; 383: 1958. doi: 10.1016/S0140-
6736(13)62645-8
21. Erfani A. The Impact of Family Planning on Women’s Educational 
Advancement in Tehran, Iran [internet]. 2012. Available from: 
http://www.icrw.org/files/publications/Erfani%20MS%20edit%20
Feb%202013.pdf
22. Karamouzian M, Shokoohi M. Sexual and Reproductive Health 
Education in Iranian Schools. The J Adolesc Health 2014; 55: 
149–50. doi: 10.1016/j.jadohealth.2014.04.009
23. Roudi-Fahimi F, Moghadam VM. Empowering women, 
developing society: Female education in the Middle East and 
North Africa. Washington, DC: Population Reference Bureau; 
2003.
